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Deducting the Cost of Smoking Cessation Programs Under In-
ternal Revenue Code Section 213 
Internal Revenue Code Section 213 allows individual taxpayers 
to deduct "amounts paid . . . for the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, 
treatment, or prevention of disease, or for the purpose of affecting 
any structure or function of the body."1 The scope of this deduction 
has not proved susceptible to precise de:finition.2 The relevant Treas-
ury Regulations "confin[e]" the deduction "strictly to expenses in-
curred primarily for the prevention or alleviation of a physical or 
mental defect or illness," and disqualify expenses that are "merely 
beneficial to [one's] general health."3 
The courts and the Internal Revenue Service have relied on this 
. distinction between combating a specific illness and promoting gen-
eral health to differentiate deductible medical expenses from nonde-
ductible personal expenses.4 Both apply a two-part test to determine 
whether an expense qualifies for a section 213 deduction. The tax-
payer must show (1) the existence or iroroim:mt probability of a dis-
ease or defect, and (2) that the expense related directly and 
proximately to the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment or preven-
tion of that disease or defect.5 
The IRS does not currently permit a medical expense deduction 
for the costs of participation in a smoking cessation program 
("SCP").6 These programs offer a variety of treatments to enable 
smokers to end their dependence on cigarettes.7 The Service does 
1. I.R.C. § 213(e)(l)(A) (1982). Regarding amounts paid for "the purpose of affecting any 
structure or functiQn of the body," see Mattes v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 650 (1981) (hair trans-
plant operation constitutes medical care); Rev. Rul. 76-332, 1976-2 C.B. 81 (facelift constitutes 
medical care). The Code also allows a medical deduction for transportation costs incurred in 
connection with medical care, I.R.C. § 213(e)(l){B) (1982), and for amounts paid for health 
insurance, I.R.C. § 213(e)(l)(C) (1982). 
2. See, e.g., B. BITIKER & L. STONE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 219-20 (5th ed. 1980) 
("Obviously, the medical expense deduction, and its close relatives, is very difficult to adminis-
ter and gives rise to results not easily reconcilable."). The problem results, in part, from the 
breadth of the statutory definition, which technically includes ordinary living expenses neces-
sary to maintain one's health, such as re~t and groceries. See Hodgkin, Jf You Eat to Stay 
Healthy-Here's New Light on the Medical Deduction, 30 TAXES 206 (1952). 
3. Treas. Reg. § 1.213-l(e)(l)(ii) (1957). 
4. See Jacobs v. Commr., 62 T.C. 813, 818 (1974); Stringham v. Commr., 12 T.C. 580, 584 
(1949), ajfd per curiam, 183 F.2d 579 (6th Cir. 1950); Havey v. Commr., 12 T.C. 409, 412 
(1949); Rev. Rul. 79-162, 1979-1 C.B. 116; Rev. Rul. 55-261, 1955-1 C.B. 307. 
5. See note 4 supra. 
6. See Rev. Rul. 79-162, 1979-1 C.B. 116; Ltr. Rul. 7906009 (Aug. 10, 1978); Ltr. Rul. 
7601150610A (Jan. 15, 1976); Andrews, Taxes, N.Y. Times, June 5, 1979, § D, at 2, col I; 
Rankin, Taxes, N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1979, § D, at 2, col 3. 
1. See Schwartz, Review and Evaluation of Methods of Smoking Cessation, 1969-77, 94 PuB. 
HEALTH REP. 558 (1979). 
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not view tobacco addiction as a disease itself, nor does it view the 
cessation of smoking as preventing the onset of imminent, smoking-
related diseases. Consequently, the Service concludes that the cost 
of such a program is a nondedmrtible, personal expense under I.R.C. 
§ 262.8 
This Note argues that enrollment fees for a smoking cessation 
program should be classified as deductible9 medical expenses. 10 Part 
I defends this conclusion without questioning the accepted interpre-
tation of section 213(e). Recent medical evidence indicates that the 
nicotine addiction that cessation program patients seek to break is 
itself a disease. And even prior to the onset of more serious health 
consequences, sustained cigarette smoking significantly impairs the 
functioning of the lungs and heart. Under this analysis, enrollment 
fees should be deductible as expenses for the treatment of an existing 
disease or defect, and as "amounts paid . . . for the purpose of af-
8. I.R.C. § 262 (1982) provides: "Except as otherwise expressly provided in this chapter, no 
deductions shall be allowed for personal, living, or family expenses." 
9. Throughout this Note, the term "deductible" refers to an expense that falls within the 
I.R.C. § 213(e) definition of medical care. Medical expenses, however, are deductible only to 
the extent they are ''not compensated for by insurance or otherwise" and exceed three percent 
of a taxpayer's "adjusted gross income" as defined in I.R.C. § 62. A taxpayer may deduct one 
half the cost of health insurance, up to $150. See I.R.C. § 213(a)(2) (1982). Additional 
amounts for insurance are included when calculating whether the taxpayer has exceeded the 
three percent threshold. Treas. Reg. 1.213-l(e)(4) (1982). Medicine and drug purchases up to 
1% of adjusted gross income are not deductible. See I.R.C. § 213(a)(l) (1982). Amounts 
above one percent of adjusted gross income are included with other expenses when calculating 
whether the taxpayer has exceeded the three percent threshold. See I.R.C. § 213(b) (1982). As 
of January 1, 1983, medical expenses will be deductible under § 213(a) to the extent they 
exceed five percent of adjusted gross income. I.R.C. § 213(a)(2) (1982), which allowed a de-
duction of one half of medical insurance premiums, up to $150, irrespective of the percentage 
of adjusted gross income limitation, has been repealed. Thus, these insurance premiums will 
be included in the deduction when expenses exceed the 5% threshold. 
10. This Note attempts to determine only whether the allowance of a deduction for such 
fees is consistent with§ 213. The larger issue of whether the entire medical deduction scheme 
is theoretically sound is beyond the scope of this Note, but has evoked considerable debate. 
See Andrews, Personal .Deductions or an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REv. 309 (1972); 
Kelman, Personal .Deductions Revisted· Why They Fit Poorly in an ''Ideal" Income Tax and 
Why They Fil Worse in a Far From Ideal World, 31 STAN. L. REV. 831, 832-33 (1979). Profes-
sor Kelman views medical expenses as personal consumption; Professor Andrews perceives 
them as involuntary expenditures and thus justly excluded from personal income. Part of 
Professor Kelman's analysis identifies the pursuit of dangerous consumption, such as that of 
cigarettes, as deliberate gratification with adverse medical consequences. Part of Professor An-
drews' analysis argues that the percentage threshold requirement subsumes any voluntary 
medical expenses. A general consensus maintains that the deduction is an inefficient and ineq-
uitable approach to subsidizing health care. 
Congress adopted the medical deduction in 1942 to distribute more equitably the increased 
tax burden occasioned by World War II. See S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1942), 
reprinted in 1942-2 C.B. 504, 508; 88 CONG. REc. 8469 (1942) (remarks of Rep. Hinshaw), Its 
continued existence may signal a congressional purpose to encourage health care with an ad-
mittedly inferior type of subsidy, as a theoretically justified exclusion from income, as Profes-
sor Andrews argues, or simply an unwillingness to mandate the line drawing between the 
discretionary and nondiscretionary components of medical expenses, as Professor Kelman's 
analysis would.demand. Allowing a deduction for smoking cessation programs, however, is 
consistent with all of these rationales. See notes 85-86 supra and accompanying text. 
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fecting any structure or function of the body." Part II reconsiders 
whether the language or logic of section 213 requires the demonstra-
tion of imminent probability of disease to justify deducting the cost 
of a preventive health measure. This Part argues that cessation pro-
gram costs qualify as "amounts paid . . . for the prevention: of dis-
ease" within the meaning of the Code, notwithstanding the delay 
between smoking and the onset of smoking-related diseases. Thus, 
the Note concludes that the cost of a smoking cessation program, 
whether viewed as treatment or prevention, should qualify for a 
medical expense deduction under I.R.C. § 213. 
I. PRESENT ILLNESS OR BODILY FUNCTION 
A taxpayer who suffers from an existing disease or defect may 
deduct expenses for the diagnosis, treatment, mitigation, or cure of 
that disease or defect. 11 In an early medical deductions case, 12 the 
Tax Court announced the general rule that courts and the Internal 
Revenue Service continue to follow: "[a]bsent special circumstances 
of illness, accident, or physical or mental defects, . . . normal, per-
sonal, and parental" expenses are not deductible under section 213.13 
The IRS has concluded that since smoking is not a disease, the 
cost of a smoking cessation program does not qualify as a deductible 
treatment expense. In a recent Revenue Ruling, the Service assumed 
that "participation in [a cessation program] was not for the purpose 
of curing any specific ailment or disease, but for the pupose of im-
proving [the participant's] general health and sense of well-being."14 
Without considering whether habitual smoking is itself a disease, the 
Service simply noted the lack of a specific illness. Although the pro-
gram had been prescribed by a doctor, 15 the Service concluded that 
the enrollment fees were not medical expenses under section 213.16 
Similarly, in two Letter Rulings17 on smoking cessation programs, 
the IRS relied upon the lack of a specific illness in ruling their costs 
nondeductible.18 The 1979 Ruling, citing studies conducted in 
11. See note 1 supra. 
12. Wendell v. Commr., 12 T.C. 161 (1949). 
13. 12 T.C. at 163. 
14. Rev. RuL 79-162, 1979-1 C.B. 116. 
15. Even if a program is run by doctors, a deduction may be denied. See Wendell v. 
Commr., 12 T.C. 161, 163 (1949) (nurse's care expenses not deductible) (''The issue turns on 
the nature of the services rendered, not on the experience or qualifications or title of the person 
employed."); Rev. RuL 63-91, 1963-1 C.B. 54; see note 52 infra. 
16. Although there are no rulings on point, an SCP would presumably be deductible if the 
taxpayer shows that he presently suffers from a smoking-related disease. 
17. Letter Rulings are issued by the Internal Revenue Service in response to taxpayers' 
requests for decisions with respect to past or contemplated transactions. See J. CHOMMIE, 
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 11 (1968). Although they indicate the Service's position on spe-
cific areas, they have no formal precedential value. See I.R.C. § 6110(j)(3) (1982). 
18. See Ltr. RuL 7906009 (Aug. 10, 1978); Ltr. RuL 7601150610A (Jan. 15, 1976). 
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197519 and 1971,20 stated that "[o]ur research indicates that medical 
authorities do not at this time recognize smoking itself as a dis-
ease."21 The Ruling denied the relevance of the stipulated fact that 
the taxpayer undertook the program for reasons which included mit-
igation of existing health defects, including a persistent "smoker's 
cough."22 But the available medical evidence indicates that either 
the addictive or the bronchopulmonary consequences of smoking 
suffice to bring the costs of smoking cessation programs within the 
ambit of section 213. 
A. Nicotine Addiction as a .Disease 
The Service's conclusion that cigarette smoking is not itself a dis-
ease accords insufficient importance to the tobacco dependence 
which motivates smokers to seek professional help. Overwhelming 
clinical evidence supports characterizing smoking as a physical ad-
diction, one that persists even though the addict knows it subjects 
him to serious risk of death. Both medical and legal authorities now 
recognize such a condition as a disease. 
The very existence of professional programs to help people quit 
smoking suggests that the habit's persistence results from more than 
mere social convention. Survey research documenting that most 
smokers have tried to quit and failed, and that a still larger majority 
expresses the desire to quit but believes that it is impossible, makes 
the characterization of smoking as an addiction difficult to avoid.23 
The nearly universal awareness of the adverse health consequences 
of continued tobacco use indicates the strength of this dependence.24 
19. U. S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, & WELFARE, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF 
SMOKING: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL (1975). 
20. ROYAL COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS OF LONDON, SMOKING AND HEALTH Now: A NEW 
REPORT AND SUMMARY ON SMOKING AND ITS EFFECTS ON HEALTH (1971). 
21. Ltr. Rul. 7906009 (Aug. IO, 1979). 
22. Id 
23. See, e.g., Antismoldng Initiatives of the IJepartment of Health, Education, and Welfare: 
Hearing on Secretary Cal!fano's Announcement of the IJepartment of Health, Education, and 
Welfare's New Antismoking Effert Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the 
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 320 (1978) [hereinaf-
ter cited as 1978 Hearings] (statement of John Banzahf, Executive Director) ("For the great 
majority of Americans . • • smoking is hardly a voluntary act. The most recent HEW survey 
indicated that fully six out of every ten adult smokers has made one or more serious attempts 
to quit smoking, and that an additional three out of ten would like to quit if only it weren't so 
difficult"); Russell, Nicotine Intake and Its Regulation, 24 J. PSYCHOSOMATIC RESEARCH 253, 
253-54 (1980) {70% of British smokers have tried to quit and failed). 
24. See U.S. DEP'T. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, & WELFARE, OFFICE ON SMOKING AND 
HEALTH, SMOKING AND HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 1-34 (1979) [herein-
after cited as SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT] (90% of teenage smokers are aware of the risks to 
health); 1978 Hearings, supra note 23, at 320 (statement of John Banzahf) ("[I]n extreme cases 
people have been unable to quit even when smoking was causing their death. • • ,"); Russell, 
supra note 23, at 253 (equating attempts to quit with knowledge of the risks to health); 
Schachter, Pharmacological and Psychological IJetermlnants of Smoking, 88 ANNALS OF IN-
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The clinical evidence now suffices to identify the pharmacological 
effect of nicotine as the primary, if not the sole, cause of the 
addiction.25 
Physical dependence, by itself, does not amount to a disease. But 
behavior continued despite the desire to quit and potentially fatal 
consequences cannot reasonably be described as healthy. In the case 
of smoking, medical authorities now recognize such behavior as 
symptomatic of an independent illness. The 1980 edition of the 
American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Man-
ual of Mental Disorders26 (DSM-III) identifies, for the first time,27 
''Tobacco Dependence" as a substance use disorder.28 The disor-
der's essential features are continuous tobacco use for one month 
coupled with one of three phenomena: (I) unsuccessful attempts to 
stop or significantly cut down on tobacco use, (2) development of 
Tobacco Withdrawal, or (3) the presence of a serious disorder, such 
as heart or lung disease, that the smoker knows will become aggra-
vated by continued smoking.29 By these criteria, even a heavy 
TERNAL MED. 104, 111 (1978) ("Certainly all smokers are aware of the dangers and expense of 
smoking."). · 
25. See SURGEON GENERAL'S REPoRT, supra note 24, at 1-32 ("Nicotine, the most power-
ful pharmacological agent in cigarette smoke, has been proposed as the primacy incentive in 
smoking and may be instrumental in the establishment of the smoking habit."); Kozlowski, 
Applications of Some Physical Indicators of Cigarette Smoking, 6 ADDICTIVE BEHAVIORS 213 
(1981); Russell, supra note 23; Schachter, supra note 24. Schachter summarizes the clinical 
evidence as follows: 
1. The psychological and probably the sensory gratifications of smoking are illusory. 
Serious smokers smoke to erevent withdrawal. 
2. Smokers regulate nicotine intake. 
3. Variations in smoking rate, which customarily have been interpreted in psychological 
terms, seem better understood as an attempt to regulate nicotine. 
4. Apparent exceptions to a regulatory model of smoking seem understandable in terms 
of withdrawal. The smoker who fails to regulate suffers withdrawal. 
Schachter, supra note 24, at 112. The clinical evidence, however, is not without inconsisten-
cies. See SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 24, at 16-5 to 16-9. These inconsistencies 
may be explained either by a psychological component to the addiction to cigarettes, or by the 
willingness of individuals to suffer withdrawal symptoms rather than to smoke without inhibi-
tion in a clinical setting. Schachter adopts the latter interpretation, pointing to evidence of 
stress and discomfort on the part of the subjects of those experiments which did not show 
effective compensation (by deeper inhalation, smoking down to a shorter butt, etc.) of smokers 
given lower nicotine cigarettes. See Schachter, supra note 24, at 111. Whether the addiction is 
purely physiological or contains a significant psychological component is irrelevant for the 
purposes of tax law, which permits a medical deduction for mental as well as physical illness. 
See Treas. Reg.§ 1.213-l(e)(l)(ii) (1957) (deduction confined to "prevention or alleviation of a 
physical or mental defect or illness"). 
26. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC AsSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF 
MENTAL DISORDERS (3d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as DSM-III]. 
27. H. KAPLAN, A. FREEDMAN & B. SADOCK, COMPREHENSIVE TExrBOOK OF PSYCHIA-
TRY/III 1650 (3d ed. 1980). 
28. DSM-ill, supra note 26, at 176-78. Accord, H. KAPLAN, A. FRIEDMAN & B. SADOCK, 
supra note 27, at 1650. 
29. Russell, Cigarette Smoking: _Natural History of a Dependence Disorder, 44 BRIT. J. 
MED. PSYCHOLOGY 1, 1 (1971). See also Mirkin, Nicotine Addictiqn, 13 FAMILY HEALTH 20 
(1981). 
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smoker who does not suffer from a serious physical illness related to 
tobacco use, and who has never tried to quit or reduce his smoking, 
does not suffer from the disorder even though "physiologically the 
individual is almost certainly dependent on tobacco."30 But an indi-
vidual who desires to quit and cannot, or who can do so only at the 
cost of withdrawal symptoms, need not suffer from an independent 
smoking-related disease to be diagnosed as afflicted with the 
disorder. 
Both the Surgeon General and the American Psychiatric Associa-
tion ("AP A") also classify tobacco withdrawal as an independent 
disease. The Surgeon General concluded that ''withdrawal from to-
bacco does produce a variety of signs and symptoms which can be 
characterized as a tobacco withdrawal syndrome."31 The APA identi-
fies ''Tobacco Withdrawal" as an organic mental disorder.32 
Clinical studies on the effects of nicotine suggest that the typical 
symptoms result from physical rather than psychosomatic sources.33 
And the classification of withdrawal from nicotine as a distinct dis-
ease will come as small surprise to those who have had contact with 
individuals attempting to give up cigarettes. 
30. DSM-ill, supra note 26, at 177. Nevertheless a majority of smokers probably have this 
disorder. See H. KAPLAN, A. FREEDMAN & B. SADOCK, supra note 27, at 1649 (the large 
percentage of smokers who have tried or would like to quit indicates the widespread preva-
lence of the disorder). Accord, Russell, The Smoking Habit and Its Class!ftcatlon, 212 THE 
PRACTITIONER 791 (1974). Only two percent of smokers smoke occasionally or intermittently. 
Id at 791. 
31. SURGEON GENERAL'S REP<>RT, supra note 24, at 15-25 (emphasis in original). See E. 
BRECHER, LICIT AND ILLICIT DRUGS 225-28 (1972); Russell, supra note 29, at 4. 
The Surgeon General, in a recent report, stressed the need for measures "[t]o increase the 
number of smokers who quit," and advocated implementation of an "income tax deduction 
policy for the cost of smoking cessation programs." U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV• 
ICES, PROMOTING HEALTH/PREVENTING DISEASE: OBJECTIVES FOR THE NATION 117, 121 
(1980). 
32. DSM-ill, supra note 26, at 159-60. The Manual states that 
[T]he essential characteristic is a withdrawal syndrome due to recent cessation of or re-
duction in tobacco use . . . . The syndrome includes craving for tobacco, irritability, 
anxiety, difficulty concentrating, restlessness, headache, drowsiness, and gastrointestinal 
disturbances. It is assumed that this syndrome is caused by nicotine since nicotine is the 
major pharmacologically active ingredient in tobacco. 
Accord, H. KAPLAN, A. FREEDMAN, & B. SADOCK, COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIA· 
TRY/III 1650 (3d ed. 1980). Dr. G. Burton Friden discusses nicotine addiction and medical 
deductions for the cost of participating in smoking cessation programs in a letter published in 
the Journal of tlte American Medical Association. , 
Nicotine has been shown responsible for the strong addictiveness of cigarette smoking. 
Chronic users experience physical withdrawal syndromes of relatively short duration 
(three to four days), generally followed by prolonged periods of recurrent craving that 
may last for years. • • . 
Nevertheless, a recent Internal Revenue Service ruling disallowed medical expense 
deduction of those costs incurred by a person's enrollment at a smoking treatment center 
(on the advice of his physician) .... Perhaps the contribution of medical opinion will 
support reversal of this ruling. 
Friden, Nicotine Addiction, 242 J.A.M.A. 1361, 1361-62 (1979) (footnotes omitted). 
33. See note 25 supra. 
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Neither tobacco dependence nor tobacco withdrawal character-
izes every smoker, but both almost invariably apply to those who 
enroll in smoking cessation programs. Such smokers plainly attempt 
to quit, but are unsuccessful absent professional help. The decision 
to participate in a cessation program "exhibit[ s] concern about an 
inability to stop smoking [thus satisfying] the criteria for a disor-
der."34 The American Psychiatric Association diagnoses tobacco de-
pendence when ''the individual is seeking professional help to stop 
smoking."35 The programs, moreover, assist their participants in 
coping with tobacco withdrawal, whose ill effects almost certainly 
afflict smokers who enroll in SCP's befall those who seek medical 
care to mitigate them. Whatever the label, it is not unreasonable to 
classify the inability to break a dangerous physical addiction as a 
disease. 
The law has long allowed medical deductions for the costs of 
treating less adamant and less dangerous addictions. The Service 
permits a deduction for the cost of treatment programs intended to 
cure alcoholism or drug abuse.36 Nicotine addiction resembles these 
diseases, because it involves a pharmacologically-induced physical 
dependence.37 Nicotine addiction differs from alcohol and drug 
abuse, however, in the strength of the dependence and the physical 
dangers which attend it. Neither alcohol nor even heroin exerts a 
more powerful addictive effect than nicotine.38 Neither imposes so 
34. TASK FORCE ON NOMENCLATURE AND STATISTICS OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC 
AsSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS ill B:21 
(draft 1978). 
35. DSM-ill, supra note 26, at 176. The APA also diagnoses tobacco dependence when, 
"in the judgment of the diagnostician, the use of tobacco is seriously affecting the individual's 
physical health." Id 
36. Rev. Rul. 73-325, 1972-2 C.B. 75; Rev. Rul. 72-226, 1972-1 C.B. 96 (citing Linder v. 
United States, 268 U.S. 5, 18 (1925)) (persons addicted to narcotics "are diseased and proper 
subjects for [medical] treatment."). · 
31. See E. BRECHER, supra note 31, at 207; Harrop, Hansen & Soghikian, Clinical Methods 
in Smoking Cessation: .Description and Evaluation of a Stop Smoking Clinic, 69 AM. J. Pull. 
HEALTH 1226, 1230 (1979); Less Tar, Less Nicotine: Is Thal Good?, 1976 CONSUMER REP. 274, 
274; Russell, The Smoking Habit and Its C/asstftcation, 212 PRACTITIONER 791, 791 (1974); 
Russell, supra note 29, at 3. 
38. See Russell, supra note 29, at 3: 
It is far easier lo become dependent on cigarelles than alcohol or barbituales. Most users 
of alchohol or sleeping tablets are able to limit themselves to intermittent use and to 
tolerate pei,:iods free of the chemical effect. If dependence occurs it is usually in a setting 
of psychological or social difficulty. Not so with cigarettes; intermittent or occasional 
smoking is a rarity - about 2 percent of smokers. [Citation omitted.] If he smokes al all, 
tlte most stable well adjusted person sooner or later becomes a regular dependent user (or 
misuser) - in other words, he is hooked 
(Emphasis added.) 
The experience of American servicemen returning from Southeast Asia offers an illumi-
nating contrast. In one study of 500 servicemen who had positive urine tests before they left 
Vietnam, 96% of whom admitted experimenting with heroin, only 7% of the cohort were ad-
dicted to any kind of narcotics one year later, according to follow-up interviews and urine 
tests. STRATEGY COUNCIL ON DRUG ABUSE, FEDERAL STRATEGY FOR DRUG ABUSE AND 
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high a risk of death.39 Given that the relevant distinctions 
strengthen the argument for deeming nicotine addiction a disease, 
these rulings add to the difficulties of justifying the Service's current 
approach to smoking cessation programs. In light of both medical 
and legal authorities, then, the cost of smoking cessation programs 
should be deductible as an expense undertaken for the treatment of 
an existing illness. 
B. Smoking Cessation and the Purpose To Affect a Function or 
Strocture of the Body 
The Code provides that "medical care" expenses include 
amounts paid "for the purpose of affecting any structure or function 
of the body."40 The Treasury Regulations interpret these words to 
mean that "[a]mounts paid for operations or treatments affecting any 
portion of the body" are deductible.41 The taxpayers who requested 
the 1978 Letter Ruling suffered from recurring coughing; their physi-
cian advised them that quitting smoking would improve this condi-
tion.42 The Service did not find this fact dispositive, because "not 
every expenditure prescribed by a physician is to be catalogued" as 
medical care.43 This analysis does not consider the possibility of 
classifying smoking cessation programs as "treatment" for the pur-
pose of affecting certain structures and functions of the body. 
Smoking adversely affects several "structures and functions of 
the body." Nicotine exerts physiological effects on heart rate, metab-
olism, and (as would be expected from its addictive influence) on the 
DRUG TRAFFIC PREVENTION 1973 at 11-12 (1973). See also E. BRECHER, supra note 31, at 216 
(quoting a personal communication of Vincent P. Dole: "Cigarette smoking is a true addic-
tion. The confirmed smoker acts under a compulsion which is quite comparable to that of the 
heroin user''); id. at 217 (quoting a former heroin addict: "It was much easier to quit heroin 
than cigarrettes"). 
39. Russell, supra note 23, at 253 (noting that cigarette smoking is the most dangerous 
habit which would be studied at a conference on addictive behavior, and citing a Royal Col-
lege of Physicians estimate that "one in three cigarette smokers die as a result of smoking"). 
The available statistics reinforce this somewhat striking conclusion. There are about 54.1 mil-
lion regular smokers in the United States. SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 24, at A-
ll. The government attributes 320,000 annual deaths to smoking, see note 70 infra, or an 
annual per capita mortality rate of I in 167. By contrast, government estimates for 1973 placed 
the number of heroin addicts at 600,000, with 2,000 deaths attributable to heroin as the "direct 
cause." STRATEGY COUNCIL ON DRUG AJJuse,supra note 38, at 12-14. These numbers yield a 
per capita mortality rate of I in 300 - or about half that for cigarettes. Such statistics are of 
course imprecise, but the estimates of a government committed to an enforcement approach to 
the narcotics problem, if anything, are likely to underestimate the number of addicts and over-
estimate the number of deaths directly caused by heroin. In addition, these estimates attempt 
to account only for heroin addicts, and not the considerable number of irregular users. There 
are virtually no nicotine "chippers." 
40. See note 1 supra. 
41. Treas. Reg. § 1.213-l(e)(l}(ii) (1957). 
42. Ltr. Rul. 7906009 (Aug. 10, 1978). 
43. Id. (citing Seymour v. Commr., 14 T.C. 1111 (1950)). 
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brain.44 Smoking has a more pernicious effect upon the lungs. Ciga-
rette smoke tends to constrict airways and blood vessels, and to im-
pair the lungs' self-cleaning and immune systems. 45 These 
consequences play a significant role in the etiology of a variety of 
respiratory malfunctions, ranging from "smoker's cough" to fatal 
cases of emphysema.46 More relevant to the present interpretation of 
section 213, these impacts on the structure and function of the heart, 
lungs, and brain occur immediately with every cigarette consumed.47 
The expense of a smoking cessation program is undertaken for 
the purpose of affecting these bodily structures and functions. Par-
ticipants hope to eliminate and reverse the deterioration of the struc-
ture of their lungs and the accompanying impairment of respiratory 
functions. They hope also to alter bodily functions by successfully 
abstaining from tobacco, thereby attenuating the addictive impact of 
nicotine upon the brain. 
Such purposes are at least as medical as plastic surgery or hair 
transplants, whose costs are deductible as amounts paid for the pur-
pose of affecting a structure or function of the body.48 Those rulings 
pose a considerably greater risk of permitting abuse of the medical 
deduction than would inhere in any decision to allow a deduction for 
smoking cessation programs, especially given ~e availability of fa-
miliar limiting doctrines. Restricting deductions to expenses which 
do not yield nonmedical rewards, and to the amount minim~lly suffi-
44. See, e.g., SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 24, at 1S-16 to 1S-19; sources cited 
in note 25 supra; Russell, supra note 23. 
4S. See, e.g., SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 24, at 14-76-77 (animal studies 
reveal pulmonary and cardiovascular damage to structure and functions of lungs, heart, and 
blood vessels); Cigarette Smoking and .Disease, 1976: Hearings on S. 2902 Before the Subcomm. 
on Health of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. S34-37 
(1976) [hereinafter cited as 1976 Hearings] (statement of Benjamin Byrd, Jr., M.D., President, 
American Cancer Society) ("A pack-a-day smoker inhales about a cup, eight ounces, of 'tar' or 
smoke condensate each year. This not only corrodes the extremely delicate lining of the lungs, 
but defeats the lungs' • • . attempts to expel the poison. • . • These poisons, deposited with 
every inhalation, combined with the attack on the lungs' defense mechanisms, are probably the 
reason why 99 percent of pack-a-day smokers have some emphysema •..• "); Cosio, Hale & 
Niewoehner, Morphologic and Morphometric Effects of Prolonged Cigarette Smoking on the 
Small Airways, 122 AM. REv. OF REsPIRATORY DISEASE 26S (1980) (smokers suffer greater 
structural damage to small airways than nonsmokers); Hale, Niewoehner & Cosio, Morpho-
logic Changes in the Muscular Pulmonary Arteries: Relationship to Cigarelle Smoking, Airway 
.Disease, and Emphysema, 122 AM. REv. OF REsPIRATORY DISEASE 273 (1980) (smokers suffer 
structural damage to the pulmonary blood vessels). 
46. See SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 24, at 6-23 to 6-32. 
47. See Russell, supra note 23, at 254 (reporting that each inhalation delivers a nicotine 
stimulus to the brain); 1976 Hearings, supra note 4S, at S34-37 (Statement of Benjamin Byrd) 
(each inhalation delivers nicotine stimulus, and deposits damaging tar in the lungs: "Within 
seconds after a smoker inhales cigarette smoke, his blood pressure starts rising by ten to 20 
points, his heart rate increases by 25 beats per minute, his skin temperature drops five or six 
degrees • . . "). 
48. Mattes v. Commr., 77 T.C. 6S0 (1981) (hair transplant deductible); Rev. Rul. 76-332, 
1976-2 C.B. 81 (facelift deductible). 
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cient to fulfill medical purposes, will effectively prevent abuse of sec-
. tion 213.49 The apprehension of such abuse, in any event, does more 
to justify denying a future claim because the taxpayers would enjoy 
a medical deduction for a personal expense, or have claimed an ex-
travagant amount, than it does to justify denying a legitimate deduc-
tion for fear that courts will prove unable to articulate the 
distinctions between deductions perceived as abusive and those seen 
as legitimate. 
C. .Direct-Relation Between Medical Purpose and Expense 
The fact that cessation program participants suffer from a dis-
ease, however, does not suffice to render the programs' enrollment 
fees deductible medical expenses. The claimed deduction must also 
"directly and proximately" relate to diagnosing, curing, treating, or 
mitigating a specific illness.5° Courts have not always agreed on the 
meaning of "direct and proximate." While early cases listed a set of 
factors to consider in determining whether the requisite relationship 
between expense and disease existed,51 decisions have not consist-
ently rested on any single factor or combination of factors.52 Recent 
cases, in an effort to avoid confusion, have developed a modified 
"but for'' test: A taxpayer must "prove both that the expenditures 
were an essential element of the treatment and that they would not 
have otherwise been incurred for nonmedical reasons."53 
Payments for smoking cessation programs satisfy both require-
ments of the ''but for'' test. The participants accrue no significant 
49. The most obvious claim for a deduction similar to that defended here would involve 
the costs of exercise. The Service could defeat such a claim by relying on either analytical 
limitation. Nonmedical benefits motivate the taxpayer to exercise, and the typical therapeutic 
exercise regime - running - costs virtually nothing of itself. 
50. See note 5 supra and accompanying text. 
51. See Havey v. Commr., 12 T.C. 409,412 (1949), which suggests the following factors be 
considered in determining the existence of the requisite relationship: taxpayer's motive; 
whether there was a doctor's recommendation; whether the belief that the treatment would be 
efficacious was reasonable; temporal proximity to the onset of the disease as to make one the 
true occasion of the other. 
52. For example, courts have denied deductions for treatments recommended by a physi-
cian, and allowed deductions for expenses incurred without such recommendation. Compare 
France v. Commr., 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 508 (1980) (denying medical deductions for amounts 
taxpayer paid for dancing lessons, upon doctor's recommendations, for treatment of arthritis), 
and Rabb v. Commr., 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 476 (1972) (denying medical deduction for amounts 
spent on shopping excursions recommended by taxpayer's psychiatrist), with Rev. Rul. 76-332, 
1976-2 C.B. 81 (allowing deduction for the cost of facelift operation not recommended by 
physician). 
53. Jacobs v. Commr., 62 T.C. 813, 819 (1974) (emphasis in original). See Estate of 
Marantz v. Commr., 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 516 (1979). In Jacobs the taxpayer claimed as a medi-
cal expense the legal expenses of his divorce, which his psychiatrist had recommended as nec-
essary for treating the taxpayer's mental illness. The court held that these payments arising 
from the divorce proceeding were not amounts paid for medical care, because the court was 
convinced that the taxpayer would have made these expenditures even if he had not been ill. 
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non.medical benefits. But for the addiction to cigarettes and the re-
sulting risk of contracting smoking-related diseases,54 no significant 
reason exists to pay the price, in dollars and in effort, of profession-
ally assisted abstinence from tobacco.55 While significant non.medi-
cal incentives may make incurring the costs of a vacation,56 a 
vacuum cleaner,57 dancing lessons,58 or a health spa59 more attrac-
tive, smoking cessation programs are ''wholly medical in nature and 
[serve] no other legitimate function in everyday life.60 
Nor should any doubt exist about the connection between smok-
ing cessation programs and the health consequences which motivate 
their participants. The programs offer essential treatment for curing, 
or at least mitigating, 61 tobacco dependence for those unable to quit 
54. See notes 104-09 in.fra and accompanying text. 
55. It is, of course, possible that a few individuals will attend for other reasons. For exam-
ple, A, who has never smoked, may attend only because his friend B, a heavy smoker, has 
asked him to come along to the sessions. Given emollment fees of $250 or more, such in-
stances are likely to be rare. See Schwartz, Review and Evaluation ef Methods ef Smolcing 
Cessation, 1969-77, 94 PuB. HEALTH REP. 558, 560 (1979). 
56. See Havey v. Commr., 12 T.C. 409 (1949). In Havey the taxpayer claimed a medical 
expense deduction on his 1945 income tax return which included the cost of room and board at 
two New Jersey hotels and a ranch in Arizona. In 1943 the taxpayer's wife suffered a coronary 
occlusion and had been critically ill. A doctor had advised the taxpayer to take his wife to the 
seashore during the humid summer months and to Arizona during the winters. The Tax Court 
denied the deduction, noting that the Haveys had vacationed at the Arizona ranch before the 
wife had become ill in 1943, and that the expense came two years after the wife's coronary 
occlusion. The court declared: ''We do not question the fact that the trips may have been 
beneficial to petitioner's wife. . . . The record fails to show, however, that the benefit derived 
by the wife was in any respect different from that enjoyed by any vacationer at the same resorts 
at the same time." See also Tautolo v. Commr., 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 1198 (1975) (expense of 
trips to Samoa for healing of paralysis held not deductible); Foyer v. Commissioner, 19 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 1370 (1960) (trips to Arizona and Hawaii for alleviation of respiratory ailments not 
deductible); Dobkin v. Commr., 15 T.C. 886 (1950) (annual Florida trip, advised by physician, 
several years after coronary occlusion not deductible). But see Rev. Rul. 58-110, 1958-1 C.B. 
155 (transportation costs for taxpayer and nurse to a specified location predetermined by phy-
sician for sole purpose of alleviating chronic respiratory ailment deductible); Rev. Rul 55-261, 
1956-1 C.B. 307 (cost of trip to Florida solely for benefit of taxpayer's postoperative throat and 
lung condition deductible). 
57. See Rev. Rul 76-80, 1976-1 C.B. 71. 
58. See France v. Commr., 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 508 (1~80). 
59. See Rev. Rul. 55-261, 1955-1 C.B. 307, 310. 
60. Stringham v. Commr., 12 T.C. 580, 584 (1949), qffd per curiam, 183 F.2d 579 (6th Cir. 
1950). 
61. Success rates for SCPs vary widely. Generally, success rates at the end of the program 
are quite high, approximately 80%. After one year, the success rates are approximately 35-
40%. See SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 24, at 21-14 to 21-15; Evans & Lane, 
Long-Term Outcome of Smoking Cessation Workshops, 70 AM. J. Pua. HEALTH 725 (1980); 
Harrup, Hansen & Soghikian, Clinical Methods in Smoking Cessation: Description and Evalua-
tion of a Stop Sl1}oking Clinic, 69 AM. J. Pua. HEALTH 1226 (1979); Schwartz, Review and 
Evaluation of Methods of Smoking Cessation, 1969-77, 94 Pua. HEALTH REP. 558 (1979). 
Whether an individual smoker is cured of his addiction by an SCP is not dispositive. What 
matters for deductibility is that a person undertake the expense with a reasonable belief that 
the treatment can be successful q: Tautolo v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 1198 (1975) 
(denying a medical deduction for the cost of travel to Samoa for treatment by native Samoan 
doctors). The court found that the taxpayer could not have held a reasonable belief that the 
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without professional help. Facilitating the cessation of smoking ad-
dresses nicotine addiction as directly as medical science currently 
permits. Similarly, the impact of cessation on the structure and func-
tioning of the lungs and brain follows directly from eliminating the 
intake of cigarette smoke. 
II. PREVENTION 
I.R.C. Section 213 and Treasury Regulation 1.213(l)(E)(l)(i) in-
clude "prevention of disease" within the meaning of medical care. 62 
Neither the Code nor the Regulations, however, defines prevention. 
Therefore, distinguishing between deductible medical expenditures 
incurred "primarily for the prevention . . . of a physical or mental 
defect or illness"63 and those nondeductible, personal expenses that 
are "merely beneficial to [one's] general health"64 has remained 
within the purview of judicial interpretation. 
In Stringham v. Commissioner,65 the Tax Court looked to con-
gressional intent as emb9died in the Code, the Regulations, and Sen-
ate Reports and interpreted the medical expense deduction 
provisions. Although the case involved treatment of an existing ail-
ment, 66 the court, in dicta, declared that "Congressional intent is suf-
ficiently evident to require the showing of . . . the imminent 
probability of a disease, physical or mental defect, or illness as the 
initial step in qualifying an expenditure as a medical expense."67 
The Court then reiterated the condition announced in the Regula-
tions that "a deduction may be claimed only for such expenses in-
curred primarily for the prevention ... of [a] particular physical or 
mental defect or illness."68 
Later cases and IRS rulings have generally followed the 
Stringham court's conclusion that a taxpayer must show the immi-
nent probability of a specific disease or defect before a preventive 
treatment, consisting of prayers and massages with plant leaves, would be effective for his 
wife's stroke. 34 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1200. For criticism of this requirement, see Note, .Defining 
"Medical Care'~· The Key lo Proper Application of the Medical Expense .Deduction, 1977 DuKB 
LJ. 909, 924-32. 
62. See I.R.C. § 213(e)(l)(A) (1982); Treas. Reg. § 1.213-l(e)(l)(i) (1957). 
63. See Treas. Reg. § 1.213-l(e)(l)(ii) (1957). 
64. Id. 
65. 12 T.C. 580 (1949)., qffd. per curiam, 183 F.2d 579 (6th Cir. 1950). 
66. The court held that expenses incurred in connection with the transportation to, and 
maintenance of, the taxpayer's daughter at a boarding school in Arizona, exclusive of expenses 
attibutable to her education were deductible. The court noted the existence of the child's 
chronic respiratory ailments that could be ameliorated by the favorable Arizona climate, and 
declared that the taxpayer's only purpose in sending his daughter to Arizona was to make it 
''possible for her to recover from her then present illness." 12 T.C. at 585. 
67. 12 T.C. at 584. 
68. 12 T.C. at 584; see note 63 supra and accompanying text. 
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health measure may qualify for a deduction.69 Because smoking does 
not present a smoker with an imminent probability of disease, the 
IRS has denied medical deductions for smoking cessation programs, 
even though such programs address the most preventable cause of 
death and disease in the United States.70 
Further analysis of the language and legislative history of the 
medical deduction, however, reveals that the courts and the IRS 
have unwisely relied on the Stringham dicta which read an immi-
nence requirement into the statutory meaning of "prevention." Part 
A reconsiders the current construction of section 213, and concludes 
that the section's language, regulations and legislative history do not 
require, and may forbid, the imposition of an imminence prerequi-
site to a medical deduction. Part B reformulates the two-part test 
articulated in Stringham, emphasizing the causal relationship of the 
expense to the prevention of the feared disease, without requiring 
temporal proximity of the threatened illness. The reformulated test 
is then evaluated to determine if the absence of an imminence re-
quirement unduly broadens the definition of prevention. Part C ap-
plies the reformulated test to smoking cessation programs, and 
concludes they should qualify as deductible preventive medical 
expenditures. 
A. Statutory Construction 
This Note advances two objections to the current interpretation 
of section 213, which requires that an expense be incurred shortly 
before the threatened 011-5et of a specific disease to qualify for the 
deduction. First, the statutory language does not impose this re-
quirement. Second, advances in epidemiology have significantly 
clarified the precision with which medical science can define the im-
pact of preventive health measures. Consequently, the apprehension 
69. See Hollander v. Commr., 219 F.2d 934, 935 (3d Cir. 1955) (cost of stair climbing 
device installed to prevent further heart damage after initial heart attack deductible); Daniels 
v. Commr., 41 T.C. 324, 328 (1963) (cost of fallout shelter constructed to protect taxpayers 
against sickness from fallout radiation not deductible since imminent probability of disease 
not shown); Dobkin v. Commr., 15 T.C. 886, 888 (1950) (annual Florida trip, advised by physi-
cian, not deductible where existing or imminent probability of disease or defect not shown). 
10. See U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, PROMOTING HEALTH/PREVENTING 
DISEASE: OBJECTIVES FOR THE NATION 117 (1980); SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 
24, at 2-9. See also Mahler, Smoking or Health, The Choice is Yours-, WORLD HEALTH, 
Feb.-Mar. 1980, at 3 ("Smoking is probably the largest single preventable cause of ill health in 
the world."). 
For a discussion of the recent growth in the practice of preventive medicine, see U.S. PuB-
LIC HEALTH SERVICE OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GENERAL REl'oRT ON HEALTH PROMOTION 
AND DISEASE PREVENTION, HEW PuB. No. 79-55071A (1979); Yankauer, The lips and .Downs 
of Prevention, 11 AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 6 (1981) (editorial); Sheps, Preventive Medicine, 241 J. 
A.M.A. 1384 (1979); Saward & Sorensen, The Current Emphasis on Preventive Medicine, 200 
Ser. 889 (1978). See generally G. ROSEN, PREVENTIVE MEDICINE IN THE UNITED STATES 
(1975). 
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of abusive deductions for personal expenses claimed to be under-
taken for speculative medical purposes, although perhaps valid at 
the time of the Stringham decision, no longer justifies barring deduc-
tions for expenses incurred solely because of a scientifically demon-
strable, but long-term, relationship between individual behavior and 
serious illness. Congress intended section 213 to exempt personal 
income expended in a choice between dollars and disease from the 
individual wealth which is subject to taxation. Because modem epi-
demiology defines that dilemma decades before the actual symptoms 
of cancer or heart disease, the courts should revise their interpreta-
tion of "prevention" by abandoning the imminence requirement. 
"The starting point in every case involving the construction of a 
statute is the language itself."71 But neither the language of section 
213 nor the Regulations requires temporal proximity between the ex-
pense giving rise to the deduction and the disease that the taxpayer 
hopes to avoid. The Code simply states that "prevention of disease" 
falls within the definition of medical care.72 Treasury Regulation 
1.213-l(E)(l)(ii) refines congressional intent, but only emphasizes 
that section 213 deductions ''will be confined strictly to expenses in-
curred primarily for the prevention . . . of a physical or mental de-
fect · or illness. . . . However, an expenditure which is merely 
beneficial to ... general health ... is not an expenditure for medi-
cal care."73 Based on these two instructions - and no more - the 
Stringham court decided, and later cases have agreed,74 to require 
imminence of disease before classifying an expenditure as 
preventive.75 
Generally, ''the words of statutes - including revenue acts -
should be interpreted ... in their ordinary, everyday sense."76 The 
IRS and Tax Court's interpretation of "prevention" as including the 
notion of imminence departs from both the common usage and the 
71. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 (1975) (Powell, J., concur-
ring). See Consumer Prod. Safety Commn. v. GTE Sylvania, 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980); Grey-
hound Corp. v. Mt. Hood Stages, 437 U.S. 322, 330 (1978); Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 
462, 472 (1977). See generally 2A J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUC-
TION § 46.01 (4th ed. C. Sands 1973). 
72. I.R.C. § 213(e)(l)(A) (1982). 
73. Treas. Reg. § 1.213-l(e)(l)(ii) (1957). 
14. See note 69 supra and accompanying text. 
75. The Tax Court in Stringham also took note of a Senate Finance Committee Report, S. 
REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., 6, 96 which stated: 
It is not intended . . . that a deduction should be allowed for any expense that is not 
incurred primarily for the prevention or alleviation of a physical or mental defect or 
illness." 
12 T.C. at 583. 
76. Crane v. Commr., 331 U.S. 1, 6 (1947). See Consumer Prod. Safety Commn. v. GTE 
Sylvania, 447 U.S. 102, 108-09 (1980); Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569, 571 (1966) (per curiam); 
Hanover Bank v. Commr., 369 U.S. 672, 687 (1962); Commissioner v. Korell, 339 U.S. 619, 
627-28 (1950). 
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medical usage of prevention. "Prevent" commonly means "to stop, 
keep, or hinder (a person or agent) from doing something."77 In 
medical usage, "preventive" means "[a] prophylactic, or anything 
that arrests the threatened onset of disease."78 Neither of these defi-
nitions refers to the temporal proximity of the threatened action or 
disease. They refer to a cause and effect relationship: without a 
given "preventive" action, an occurrence or disease would ensue. 
When the action or disease sought to be avoided would ensue seems 
irrelevant in these definitions. Where courts have considered the 
meaning of "prevention" in other contexts, they have accorded the 
word its common meaning, without any temporal limitation.79 Too 
much can be made of the plain meaning rule, especially in the con-
text of the.Internal Revenue Code.80 But surely the specific inclu-
sion of prevention, and the absence of any time limit on the causal 
sequence initiated by preventive health measures, in the statutory 
language creates at least a rebuttable presumption that expenses 
clearly linked to the prevention of serious illness should be no less 
deductible than other accepted medical treatments. 
The accepted justification of the imminence requirement no 
longer provides a persuasive reason to depart from the language of 
the Code and Regulations. There is no indication in the legislative 
history of the medical deduction that Congress intended to ascribe to 
prevention a meaning other than its common usage. 81 Rather, the 
77. VIII THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1337 (1933). 
78. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1138 (4th Unabr. Lawyer's Ed. 1976). 
79. See, e.g., Walker v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of United States, 123 F. Supp. 306, 307-
08 (E.D. Ill. 1954); Green v. State, 109 Ga. 536, 539-40, 35 S.E. 97, 99 (1900); Lake Erie & 
W.R. v. McFall, 165 Ind. 574, 579, 76 N.E. 400, 402 (1905); Orme v. Atlas Gas & Oil, 217 
Minn. 27, 32, 13 N.W.2d 757, 761 (1944); City of Clovis v. Archie, 60 N.M. 239,241,290 P.2d" 
1075, 1076 (1955); Luton v. Bedham, 127 N.C. 96, 105, 37 S.E. 143, 146 (1900) (Douglas J., 
dissenting); Edgar v. Schmidt, 221 S.W.2d 867, 869 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949); Fidelity & Casualty 
v. Joiner, 178 S.W. 806, 809 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915); Brodde v. Grosenick, 14 Wis. 2d 341,346, 
lll N.W.2d 165, 168 (1961). 
80. See, e.g., Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 266 (1981); Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. 
United States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 (1928); Note, Tax Treatment of Previously Expensed Assets in 
Coporate Liljllidations, 80 MICH. L. REv. 1636, 1658 nn.103-05 (1982). 
81. The legislative history indicates only a concern for the equitable distribution of the 
wartime tax burden, and does not deal with the definition of medical care. See Revenue Revi-
sion of 1942: Hearings Before tlze House Committee on Ways and Means, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 
1612 (1942) (Statement of Randolph E. Paul, Tax Advisor to the Secretary of the Treasury): 
[W]e feel that in some respects [the existing] exemptions and credits are now inadequate. 
We therefore suggest to the committee that to achieve a more equitable distribution of the 
tax burden, it would be desirable to enact the following changes: 
1. Medical expenses. - A deduction should be allowed for extra-ordinary medical 
expenses that are in excess of a specified percentage of the family's net income; . . . 
S. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1942), reprinted in 1942-2 C.B. 504, 508 ("This 
allowance is recommended in consideration of the heavy tax burden that must be borne by 
individuals during the existing emergency .... "; 88 CONG. REc. 8469 (1942) (Remarks of 
Rep. Hinshaw). 
Both the House and Senate Reports on the 1954 Code state that with the exception of 
:hanging the provisions for medically required travel, subsection 213(e) ''is not intended other-
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imminence requirement is completely a creature of the Tax Court, 
inspired by the fear of permitting medical deductions for personal 
living expenses. 82 The requirement has functioned chiefly to disal-
low expenses undertaken for diseases which will probably not 
occur.83 
Temporal proximity, however, is only relevant to the extent it 
measures causal relationships. The analytical difficulty presented by 
the sort of preventive health measures typified by smoking cessation 
programs concerns probability, not proximity; most smokers will not 
contract the diseases which smoking causes. 84 An individual's risk of 
wise to change the existing definitions of medical care, to deny the cost of ordinary ambulance 
transportation nor to deny the cost of food or lodging provided as part of a hospital bill," H. 
REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., A60, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG, & Ao, NEWS 
4017, 4197.; S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 220, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CooE CONG, & 
Ao. NEWS 4621, 4856. 
The Reports, and subsequent congressional inaction regarding the definition of medical 
care, may imply legislative ratification of the Tax Court's interpretation. See Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 102 S.Ct. 1825, 1841 (1982); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 
575, 580-81 (1978). The ratification doctrine, however, is far from compelling, as indicated by 
the Supreme Court's refusal to apply it in many cases. See w. DOUGLAS, STARE DECISIS 21 
(1949) ("The Court [has] rejected numerous pleas to let Congress correct mistakes that the 
Court had created. It was also reluctant to find in the silence of Congress approval of the 
statutory intepretations which it had adopted."). Douglas argues that legislative inertia makes 
congressional redress of judicial misinterpretation difficult, and that "responsible government 
should entail the undoings of wrongs committed by the department in question," Id. at 21. It 
also seems most unlikely that Congress has given serious consideration to the incompatibility 
of the imminence requirement and the deductibility of modem preventive health practices, a 
tension which did not surface, in the case of cigarettes, until the late 1970s, See McGill v. 
EPA, 593 F.2d 631, 636 (5th Cir. 1979) ("It would be sophistry for us to divine a congressional 
intent on a subject it did not consider."); J, GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 
165 (1909) (true difficulty of interpretation is not identifying legislative intent, but deciding 
what the legislature would have intended on a point it did not consider). In light of these 
criticisms, applying the ratification doctrine to the imminence requirement would accord legis-
lative force to a Tax Court dictum over thirty years of age. Even the jurisprudence of revenue 
laws should enjoy more scope for growth than this would allow. 
82. The facts in Stringham suggest this very strongly. The taxpayer had sent their kinder-
garten-age daughter, who suffered from chronic bronchitis, to a school in Arizona, based on 
the belief that the climate there would improve her condition. The Tax Court upheld the 
deduction, but desired to limit the scope of the deduction to prevent opening a loophole for 
personal vacations, before the current travel provisions were included in § 213. The court 
derived its formula by equating "primarily for and essential to . • • prevention" in the Regula-
tions with a required showing of the "imminent probability of a disease." Stringham v. 
Commr., 12 T.C. 580, 584 (1949), qffd. per curiam, 183 F.2d 579 (6th Cir. 1950), Both the 
concurring and dissenting opinions stress the risk of abuse as a prime concern. See 12 T.C. 
580, 586-89. 
83. See, e.g., Daniels v. Commr., 41 T.C. 324, 329 (1963), where a taxpayer was denied a 
deduction for the cost of a fallout shelter on the grounds that there was, at best, a remote 
possibility of any disease occuring which would be prevented by a shelter, See note 69 supra 
and accompanying text. 
84. The epidemiological relationships usually are expressed as relative risk factors, I.e., 
smokers increase their risk of death from lung cancer by a factor of ten, of overall mortality by 
a factor of two, etc. But because these risks in any given year are slight for nonsmokers, even 
dramatic increases in relative risk do not bring the chance of contracting a smoking-related 
disease within the meaning of "imminent probability." Russell, supra note 23, at 253, trans-
lates the figures into actual risks run by smokers and concludes that "[t]hose who smoke 25 or 
more cigarettes a day at the age of 35, and continue to do so, stand a one in five chance of 
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lung cancer, even when increased an order of magnitude by smok-
ing, remains relatively small. But some individuals will certainly die 
from lung cancer, and almost all of them would not have but for 
cigarettes. The law must choose between denying the medical de-
duction for many people whose preventive measures do in fact inter-
dict the etiology of a developing disease or allowing a deduction for 
many more whose preventive measures do not. 
Whether the congressional purpose of the deduction is to exclude 
involuntary expenditures from taxable income or to subsidize quali-
ty health care,85 the courts should resolve this choice in the tax-
payer's favor. Individuals who incur expenses by changing their 
behavior due to the fear of lung cancer do so as reluctantly as their 
counterparts who bear the expense of treating existing illnesses. This 
is especially true of smoking cessation, where the taxpayer must 
overcome the added obstacle of nicotine addiction. And insofar as 
Congress has adopted a subsidy (however inegalitarian or inefficient) 
to encourage adequate health care, an even stronger case exists for 
interring the imminence requirement. For smoking-related diseases, 
for example, prevention offers a far more efficacious approach than 
treatment.86 The Service's approach denies a deduction for the cost 
of facilitating the personal behavior change (smoking cessation) 
which can save more lives than any other, while allowing a deduc-
tion for the cost of surgery and chemotherapy that do little to avert 
needless fatalities. From the standpoint of tax theory and of public 
health, this is perverse policy. 
Reforming this approach would not require an unprincipled 
deviation from stare decisis. After all, epidemiologists did not begin 
to recognize long-term links between human behavior and disease 
until after the original interpretation of the medical deduction provi-
sion. 87 The admission that times have changed - that confident sci-
entific predictions may now motivate expenses for preventive heal~ 
measures with long term consequences for specific diseases - re-
flects no disrespect for precedent. 88 It remains to be seen whether a 
dying as a result of it before the age of 65." Such risks, moreover, increase geometrically in 
proportion to the duration of smoking. Wald, Smoking as a cause of disease, 1 RECENT AD-
VANCES COMMUNITY MED. 73, 81 (1978). These dangers, while obviously grave, are nonethe-
less not "imminent." 
85. See note 10 supra. 
86. The American Cancer Society, for example, estimates that smoking causes eighty per-
cent oflung cancer, which once contracted is ninety-four percent fatal 1976 Hearings, supra 
note 45, at 535-537 (Statement of Benjamin Byrd). 
87. The association between smoking and lung cancer was the first major recognized line 
between human behaivor and disease. See SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 24, at 5-
9, identifying the early fifties as the period of the first general awareness of an association 
between lung cancer and cigarettes, based on early retrospective studies. 
88. Stare decisis is "a principle of social policy rather than an inflexible rule oflaw," which 
do~ not" 'bar coordination:oflegal philosophy with that of new and commanding facts.'" R. 
POUND, Stare .Decisis, in LAW FINDING THROUGH EXPERIENCE AND REAsoN 39 (1960) (quot-
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responsible reformulation of the current interpretation can accom-
modate a deduction for such expenses without permitting deductions 
for personal expenses. 
B. Reformation of the Two-Part Test 
Absent an imminence requirement, a taxpayer who demonstrates 
the threatened onset of a specific disease will enjoy a deduction for 
expenses directly and proximately related to the prevention of such 
illness.89 Without the narrowing influence that imminence imparts 
to the analysis, however, a strong showing of the relationship of the 
expense to the prevention of disease is needed to ensure that general 
health expenditures cannot be deducted. A further two-step test, 
similar to that employed in treatment situations,90 should ensure that 
an expense is directly and proximately related to disease prevention: 
(1) The expenditure is necessary if the taxpayer hopes to avoid a 
specific disease; and (2) But for the likelihood of disease, there are no 
other significant reasons for the particular taxpayer to incur the ex-
pense. Additionally, the familiar limitation of the deduction to the 
amount needed to fulfill adequately the medical purpose would, of 
course, remain.91 
Under this test, taxpayers could still claim deductions for ex-
penses hitherto upheld. Deductions have been allowed for the cost 
of removing lead-based paint to prevent small children from con-
tracting lead poisoning,92 the cost of a stair climbing device to pre-
vent further heart damage after a heart attack,93 and the additional 
ing Park Constr. Co. v. Independent School Dist., 209 Minn. 182, 187, 296 N.W. 475, 478 
(1941)). Indeed, of all the justifications for reforming a settled interpretation, advances in the 
scientific understanding of the subject matter express the least disrespect for the authority of 
prior cases. A more rigid adherence to precedent would require common-law rules to remain 
fixed regardless of the continued validity of the assumptions underlying them, until the legisla-
ture chose to revise them. American experience has been the reverse; the courts, and not the 
legislatures, have provided the continuous updating of legal rules required to prevent jurispru-
dential atrophy. See G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AoB OF STATUTES 3-7 (1982). 
89. See note 5 supra. 
90. See notes 50-53 supra and accompanying text. 
91. See Ferris v. Commr., 582 F.2d 1112, 1116 (7th Cir. 1978) (upholding deduction for 
therapeutically motivated swimming pool, but confining the deduction to "the minimum rea-
sonable cost of a functionally adequate" facility). The court reasoned that, while individuals 
are not required to seek the cheapest available care with respect to such health-related expend-
itures as structural changes in the home, the excess over the minimum reasonable cost is not 
related to medical care. This limitation would assume more importance with the demise of the 
imminence test, for its effect is to limit deductions for such things as exercise and special diets 
to their minimum reasonable cost. 
92. Rev. RuL 79-06, 1979-1 C.B. 114. 
93. Hollander v. Commr., 219 F.2d 934 (3d Cir. 1955). Under Treas. Reg. § l.213(e)(l)(ii) 
(1957), a capital expenditure may qualify as a medical expense to the extent that the expendi-
ture exceeds the increase in value of the property. In this case, the increase in the value was 
follll.d to be zero, so the entire expenditure was deductible. 219 F.2d at 936. 
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cost of purchasing additive-free food to prevent allergic reactions.94 
In each of these cases the taxpayer demonstrated the threatened on-
set of a specific disease, and that the expenses incurred related di-
rectly and proximately to the prevention of that illness. An 
imminence requirement in these ~ases is redundant. 
More importantly, many case& where the Service legitimately has 
denied deductions under an imminence test would still fail the pro-
posed test. This suggests that eliminating the imminence require-
ment would not create a broad loophole through which mere general 
health expenditures, which the Treasury has determined are per-
sonal,95 can be deducted as preventive. 
One of the few relevant cases illustrates the effect of the proposed 
standard. The Tax Court denied a deduction for the cost of con-
structing a fallout shelter as a preventive measure against radiation 
injury on the grounds that no showing of imminent disease was 
made.96 This result would survive the abandonment of the immi-
nence requirement, however, since the taxpayer could only show "a 
remote possibility, if any'' of the threatened disease.97 This result 
might vary with the fact finder's perception of the risks of nuclear 
war, but in any event presents no inconsistency with upholding de-
ductions for more mundane prevention measures, such as smoking 
cessation. Even though no particular smoker can establish a cer-
tainty of contracting lung cancer absent cessation, some lung cancer 
will certainly occur and smoking will cause almost all ofit. No such 
prediction describes the real but speculative risks addressed by civil 
defense precautions. _ 
The test of direct and proximate relation between the expense 
and the prevention of the disease provides a similar safeguard 
against the deduction of personal expenses. Deductions have been 
denied for such expenditures as the costs of attending a health insti-
tute,98 or of taking a vacation,99 on the ground that these merely 
promote general health. Under a prevention rationale, they would 
still be denied, because a taxpayer could probably not show both the 
necessity of incurring the expense to avoid a specific threatened dis-
ease and that he had no other significant reason to incur the expense 
other than avoiding the disease. 100 Should the taxpayer surmount 
94. Randolph v. Commr., 67 T.C. 481 (1976). 
95. I.R.C. § 262 (1982). 
96. Daniels v. Commr., 41 T.C. 324 (1963). 
97. 41 T.C. at 329. 
98. See Rev. Rut 55-261, 1955-1 C.B. 307, 310. 
99. Treas. Reg. § 1.213-l(e)(l)(ii) (1957) uses a vacation as an example of an expenditure 
which does not qualify as a medical expense because it is merely beneficial to the general 
health of a taxpayer. See note 56 supra. These cases are almost always decided on treatment 
grounds. · 
100. Naturally, many cases of this type would depend on the facts. Many expenses which 
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these obstacles, the limitation of the amount deductible to that suffi-
cient to fulfill adequately the medical purpose would restrict the de-
duction to those expenses purely medical in motive and effect.101 
One Revenue Ruling which neglects to apply the imminence test 
illustrates the factors relevant to deductibility under the proposed 
standard. The taxpayer succeeded in deducting the cost of fluoridat-
ing his family's water supply to prevent tooth decay. 102 The Service 
mentioned that fluoride strengthens dental enamel in developing 
teeth, making them more resistant to decay, and then stated that 
"since the primary and only purpose of the installation . . . is to 
prevent tooth decay, its use falls within the definition of medical 
care."103 The Service never considered whether tooth decay was im-
minent without fluoride. Instead, it looked to the great likelihood of 
disease (tooth decay) at some point in the future, the causal link be-
tween the expenditure (fluoride) and avoidance of the disease, and 
the lack of any significant reasons for the expense other than avoid-
ance of the disease. Such an approach, emphasizing causal rather 
than temporal relationships between an expenditure and avoidance 
of disease, makes good sense, and deserves general application. 
C. Application of the Test to Smoking Cessation Programs 
A smoking cessation program satisfies the first requirement of the 
two-part test: smoking imposes a significant risk of several specific 
diseases. Medical evidence has proved that cigarette smoking is a 
causal factor in heart disease, cancers of the lung, larynx, mouth, 
esophagus, pancreas, and bladder, as well as chronic bronchitis and 
emphysema.104 The American Cancer Society's research indicates 
that smoking causes at least eighty percent of lung cancer, 105 
are generally thought of as personal "may • • • in rare situations lose their identity as ordinary 
personal expenses and acquire deductibility as amounts claimed primarily for the prevention 
or alleviation of disease." Stringham v. Commr., 12 T.C. 580, 584 (1949), q/fd per cur/om, 183 
F.2d 579 (6th Cir. 1950). Compare, e.g., Rev. Rul. 79-151, 1979-1 C.B. 116 (weight loss pro-
gram not deductible), and Dobkin v. Commr., 15 T.C. 886 (1950) (trip to Florida not deducti• 
ble), with Ltr. RuL 8004111 (Oct. 31, 1979) (weight loss program deductible) and Rev. Ru!. 58-
110, 1958-1 C.B. 155 (cost of trip deductible). See notes 52, 56 supra. 
101. See note 91 supra. 
102. Rev. RuL 64-267, 1964-2 C.B. 69. 
103. Id at 70. 
104. U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, PROMOTING HEALTH/PREVENTING 
DISEASE: OBJECTIVES FOR THE NATION 117 (1980); see also SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, 
supra note 24, at 1-12 to 1-18, 5-9; Anderson, Slow-Motion Suicide, WORLD HEALTH 14 (Feb.-
Mar. 1980) · 
105. AMERICAN CANCER SOCIETY, 1978 CANCER FACTS AND FIGURES 18 (1977); P. LEV· 
ITI & E. GURALNICK, THE CANCER REFERENCE BOOK 13 (1979); see also Wald, supra note 
84, at 81 (''The risk of lung cancer rises with increased cigarette consumption, and for men 
who smoked I to 9, IO to 19, 20 to 30 and 40 or more cigarettes a day, and were aged between 
55 and 69 years, the mortality ratios were 4.7, 10.0, 16.7 and 21.0 respectively."). See generally 
SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 24, at 5-1 to 5-32. 
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accounting for 80,000 deaths annually. 106 Figures for heart disease 
are no more promising. ''The consumption of 20 or more cigarettes 
daily is associated with a hazard of [heart disease] up to three times 
greater than that found in nonsmokers"107 and accounts for nearly 
225,000 deaths annually. 108 In short, the overwhelming medical evi-
dence indicates that a smoker runs a substantial risk of developing 
lung cancer, heart disease, and a variety of other illnessess.109 
Cessation programs also satisfy the proposed standard's second 
criterion, because the programs bear a direct and proximate relation 
to the prevention of the apprehended diseases. Cessation of smoking 
greatly reduces the likelihood of contracting smoking-related dis-
eases. 110 Persistent smokers have a mortality rate double that of 
nonsmokers. m However, the Surgeon General reports that "[t]en 
years after quitting cigarette smoking, the death rates for lung cancer 
and other smoking-related causes of death approach those of non-
smokers.112 Thus, smoking cessation contributes directly, signifi-
cantly, and uniquely to the prevention of a host of diseases. Since 
professional help is essential to enable many people to quit smok-
ing, 113 its cost is an essential element of prevention of specific 
illnessess. 
Moreover, no significant reasons exist for attending a smoking 
cessation program other than avoidance of disease.114 But for the 
risk of specific illnesses, the :financial and physiological costs of to-
bacco withdrawal would not be undertaken. In sum, since the ex-
pense of a cessation program is directly and proximately related to 
or, as the Treasury Regulations put it, primarily for the purpose 
of, 115 prevention of specific diseases that the taxpayer is likely to 
contract, its costs should qualify as a deductible medical expense. 
106. See SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 24, at ii. 
107. THE HEART 1822 (J. Hurstead 4th ed. 1978). See N. SAHETA, CORONARY HEART 
DISEASE 106-07 (1969); 2 HEART DISEASE 1260 (E. Braunwald ed. 1980); Friedman, Petitti, 
Bawol & Siegelaub, Mortality In Cigarelte Smokers and Quilters, 304 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1407, 
1407 (1981); See generally, SURGEON GENERAL'S REP<>RT, supra note 24, at 4-1 to 4-76. 
108. See SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 24, at ii. 
109. See SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 24, at vii. This conclusion is supported 
by thousands of studies, id. and tens of thousands of articles. Id. at 1-5. 
110. See notes 104-09 supra and accompanying text. 
Ill. Friedman, Petitti, Bawol & Siegelaub, Mortality In Cigarelte Smokers and Quilters, 
304 NEW El_'IG. J. MED. 1407, 1408 (1981). 
112. U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, PROMOTING HEALTH/PREVENTING DIS-
EASE: OBJECTIVES FOR THE NATION 118 (1980). 
113. See note 61 supra and accompanying text. 
114. See notes 54-60 supra and accompanying text. 
ll5. Treas. Reg. § l.213-l(e)(l)(ii) (1957). 
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CONCLUSION 
Viewed as treatment of the addiction to smoking, cessation pro-
grams satisfy the current two-part test for deductibility under section 
213: (1) for program participants, nicotine addiction is a medically 
recognized disease, and (2) the programs are directly and proxi-
mately related to treatment of the disease. Therefore, just as an alco-
holic may deduct the cost of an alcoholism clinic, an addicted 
smoker should be entitled to deduct the cost of a smoking cessation 
program. A similar analysis applies when cessation programs are 
considered as treatment "for the purpose of affecting any structure or 
function of the body." 
Under a revised interpretation of section 213, the programs can 
also be viewed as prevention of smoking related diseases. An exami-
nation of section 213's language and logic indicates that a sn:i,oking 
cessation program is "prevention of disease" notwithstanding the 
delay between smoking and the onset of the diseases it causes. As a 
preventive health measure, a cessation program satisfies the two-part 
test for deductibility: (I) a participant is threatened with the onset of 
smoking related diseases, and (2) the expense is directly and proxi-
mately related to prevention of these diseases. Therefore, the cost of 
participation in a smoking cessation program should be considered a 
deductible preventive medical expense under section 213. 
